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DARIUS CHAN∗ 
 
In Orchard Capital I Ltd v Ravindra Kumar Jhunjhunwala,1 a respondent’s attempt to stay 
Singaporean proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds in favour of a non-exclusive 
jurisdiction (Hong Kong) was denied. In doing so, the Singapore Court of Appeal set out 
important principles concerning the legal effects of a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. 
This note makes a comparative analysis of the decision with English case law. It will be seen 
that the decision has taken a bold and firm step in a direction where English case law had 
previously tiptoed but still not fully embarked.  
 
Background 
The respondent was a Singaporean Permanent Resident of Indian nationality. He 
manufactured and traded refractories. He entered into various agreements with the 
appellant, which was a special purpose vehicle used to effect financial investments in another 
company. The respondent allegedly failed to meet his obligations under those agreements. 
Consequently, a settlement agreement was drawn up, with clause 23 of the agreement 
providing as follows: 
23  Governing Law 
This Agreement is governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Hong 
Kong, SAR. The Parties submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Hong 
Kong, SAR. The parties hereby knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally waive to the 
fullest extent permitted by law any rights they may have to trial by jury in respect of 
any litigation based hereon, or arising out of, under or in connection with this 
Agreement. 
The appellant commenced Singaporean proceedings following the respondent’s alleged 
breach of the settlement agreement. The respondent applied to stay those proceedings on the 
                                                          
∗ Associate, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, London. LL.B. (Hons), NUS, LL.M. (Int’l Business 
Regulation, Litigation and Arbitration), NYU. Advocate & Solicitor, Supreme Court of Singapore, Attorney & 
Counselor at Law, State of New York. 
1 [2012] SGCA 16 per Andrew Phang JA. 
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ground of forum non conveniens. The application was dismissed by an Assistant Registrar 
whose decision was overturned by the Singapore High Court. On appeal, the Singapore Court 
of Appeal reinstated the Assistant Registrar’s decision not to grant the stay. 
Reasoning 
In analysing the effect of a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement, the Singapore Court of 
Appeal observed that there were two possible themes of analysis: (a) a contractual one; and 
(b) a general procedural one.2 
The former focuses on the parties. It turns on a proper construction of the precise rights and 
obligations created by the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement at hand. The effect of the 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement flows from that construction. On the other hand, the 
latter focuses on the court’s prerogative to adjudicate and allocate international disputes. It 
deems non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements in all cases as one factor to consider within the 
orthodox forum non conveniens analysis, with its weight depending on the precise 
circumstances of each case. 
The Singapore Court of Appeal then addressed each theme seriatim. With a contractual lens, 
the Court examined all the provisions as a whole, and opined that the settlement agreement 
was intended to ensure that the respondent would discharge his obligations. The non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreement was to be construed in a manner consistent with an 
approach that benefited the appellant. Further, each of the original agreements contained an 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement (relating to Hong Kong) and the inclusion of a non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreement in the settlement agreement suggested that the appellant 
desired more flexibility in enforcing the settlement agreement. The Court also noted that the 
respondent proffered no evidence suggesting that the parties intended the non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement to have an effect akin to an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. 
The Court then addressed the procedural effect of the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. 
The Court applied the conventional Spiliada analysis and asked whether the respondent has 
discharged its burden of demonstrating that Hong Kong was a clearly or distinctly more 
appropriate forum. The Court found that the only positive factor the respondent could 
invoke was the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. Against this factor was the fact that the 
respondent was resident in Singapore and that Singapore and Hong Kong law are broadly 
similar. Relying on its preceding contractual analysis, the Court refused to grant the non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreement any more qualitative strength other than treating it as but 
one factor to consider.  
Consequently, the Court held that the respondent could not demonstrate that Hong Kong 
was a clearly or distinctly more appropriate forum. It therefore allowed the appeal. 
Comment 
The starting point for considering the effect of a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement must 
be a proper construction of the clause itself. As the Singapore Court of Appeal’s reasoning 
now shows, the procedural effect of a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement is influenced to a 
large extent by the contractual effect of the agreement. More precisely, the qualitative 
strength given to the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement in a Spiliada analysis is 
influenced by the contractual effect of that agreement. 
                                                          
2 The Singapore Court of Appeal cited and commended Yeo Tiong Min, “The Contractual Basis of the 
Enforcement of Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements” (2005) 17 SAcLJ 306 (“Yeo”). 
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This should not be remarkable on first principles. Leaving the precise mechanics aside, the 
overarching objective of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is to find that forum where 
the case may most suitably be tried for the interests of all parties and the ends of justice. The 
ends of justice would, it is suggested, include both weighty considerations of upholding a 
parties’ bargain, tempered by judicial prerogative to determine the exercise of the court’s 
jurisdiction.3 
If the present case had been heard in England, the Singapore High Court’s holding may well 
have prevailed. A series of English case law suggests that, when there is a non-exclusive 
choice of a foreign court coupled with the choice of foreign law (as in the present case), the 
case for a stay under Spiliada may be almost as strong as if the agreement had conferred 
exclusive jurisdiction on that foreign court.4 In fact, it has even been held that a non-
exclusive choice of a foreign court coupled with the choice of foreign law created a “strong 
prima facie case” that that jurisdiction is an appropriate one.5 
However, the problem with this approach is − as Prof Yeo observed − that it does not 
articulate why the contractual effect of the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement would 
warrant a “strong prima facie case” in the Spiliada analysis.6 Put another way, the cases do 
not explore with precision the content of the parties’ jurisdiction agreement.  
At its core, a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement permits a party to be sued in one or more 
identified courts without creating any positive obligation to bring proceedings in that forum. 
Subject to the proper construction of each particular agreement, there is generally no 
binding contractual obligation on either party to bring proceedings or have the dispute heard 
in the non-exclusively chosen jurisdiction. Consequently, there is no legitimate contractual 
basis why a party who wants the dispute heard elsewhere should have to face a “strong 
prima facie case”. 
Contemporary English case law fares somewhat better in articulating the precise contractual 
content of non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements. The English Court of Appeal views the 
general contractual effect of non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements in a light resembling the 
Singapore Court of Appeal:7 
“It stands to reason that by agreeing to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of 
State X the parties implicitly agree that X is an appropriate jurisdiction, and therefore 
either party should have to show a strong reason for later arguing that it is not an 
appropriate jurisdiction. … On the other hand, a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause self 
evidently leaves open the possibility that there may be another appropriate 
                                                          
3 See Yeo, at para. 28. 
4 See A. Briggs & P. Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, 5th ed. (Informa, 2009) at p. 477, citing inter alia 
Standard Steamship Owners’ P & I Association (Bermuda) Ltd v. Gann [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 528; ED & F Man 
(Sugar) Ltd v Kvaerner Gibraltar Ltd (The Rothnie) [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 206. 
5 See A. Briggs & P. Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, 5th ed. (Informa, 2009) at p. 477, citing inter alia 
Winnetka Trading Corp v. Julius Baer International Ltd [2008] EWHC 3146 (Ch) at para. 18 (“The present rules 
appear to be that the fact that the parties have freely negotiated a contract providing for the non-exclusive 
jurisdiction of a particular court creates a strong prima facie case that that court is the correct one in which to 
conduct disputes.”); see D. Joseph QC, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and their Enforcement, 2nd ed. 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) at para. 10.36 (“A non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement creates a strong prima facie case 
that the identified forum is the forum conveniens.”), citing Standard Steamship Owners’ P & I Association 
(Bermuda) Ltd v. Gann [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 528 at 533; ED & F Man (Sugar) Ltd v Kvaerner Gibraltar Ltd 
(The Rothnie) [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 206, British Aerospace v Dee Howard [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 368 at 375-376; 
Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Ltd v MLC (Bermuda) Ltd [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 767 at 781; Sinochem 
International Oil (London) Co Ltd v. Mobil Sales and Supply Corp [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 670; Bas Capital 
Funding Corp v. Medfinco Ltd [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 678. 
6 See Yeo, at para. 65 (“However, the rhetoric of the enforcement of a contractual bargain has not been matched 
by substantive explanation of the content of the agreement that is being enforced.”) 
7 Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP and ors v Deutsche Bank AG and anor [2009] EWCA Civ 725 at 
paras. 64, 108 per Toulson LJ. 
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jurisdiction. The degree of appropriateness of an alternative jurisdiction 
must depend on all the circumstances of the case. In addition to the usual 
factors, the wording of the non-exclusive jurisdiction clause may be relevant, because 
of the light which it may throw on the parties' intentions. Another possibly relevant 
factor (to which Waller J drew attention in Dee Howard) may be whether the choice 
of non-exclusive jurisdiction was specially negotiated or was contained in a standard 
form of contract. 
… 
I see no cogent reason why it should automatically be assumed that 
nomination of a non-exclusive forum should give priority or dominance 
to that forum over any other. It ignores all variables. The non-exclusive 
jurisdiction clause may in one case represent the result of specific negotiations; in 
another it may result from the use of a standard form of contract. In one case there 
may be another forum which is obviously appropriate applying the normal factors; in 
another case there may not be.” 
However, the same judgment by the English Court of Appeal also stated as follows:8 
“A non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement precludes either party from later arguing 
that the forum identified is not an appropriate forum on grounds foreseeable at the 
time of the agreement, for the parties must be taken to have been aware of such 
matters at the time of the agreement. For that reason an application to stay 
on forum non conveniens grounds an action brought in England 
pursuant to an English non-exclusive jurisdiction clause will ordinarily 
fail unless the factors relied upon were unforeseeable at the time of the 
agreement. It does not follow that an alternative forum is necessarily inappropriate 
or inferior.” 
This has led a commentator to opine that:9 
“Therefore, whilst great care needs to be paid to the specific terms of the jurisdiction 
clause, it can be stated as a matter of general principle that in the ordinary run of 
cases, unless strong cause is shown, no stay will be granted with respect to 
proceedings brought in England and Wales pursuant to an non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement in favour of England on the grounds that England is not the appropriate 
forum.” 
This also appears to be the view of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal which the Singapore 
Court of Appeal cited.10 This view is predicated on the notion that a party who has submitted 
to the non-exclusive choice of English jurisdiction cannot be heard to argue that England is 
forum non conveniens.11 It may well be that in the presence of a non-exclusive forum 
jurisdiction agreement, a respondent may find it difficult in practice to argue that another 
forum could be clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the forum. But it is difficult to 
understand why that would be so as a matter of principle. This is where one should go 
behind the convenient label of “forum non conveniens” and understand the precise 
mechanics of that doctrine. In a forum non conveniens challenge, the respondent is asserting 
                                                          
8 Ibid., at para. 50. 
9 D. Joseph QC, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and their Enforcement, 2nd ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2010) at para. 10.36. 
10 See Noble Power Investments Ltd v. Nissei Stomach Tokyo Co Ltd [2008] 5 HKLRD 632 at para. 33. 
11 See D. Joseph QC, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and their Enforcement, 2nd ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2010) at para. 10.36, citing inter alia Ace v Zurich Insurance Co Ltd [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 618 at para. 62 per Rix 
LJ (“If a party agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts of a state, it does not easily lie in its mouth to 
complain that it is inconvenient to conduct its litigation there (i.e. to assert that the agreed forum is a forum non 
conveniens)”.) 
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that another jurisdiction is a clearly or distinctly more appropriate forum; the respondent 
does not dispute that the non-exclusively chosen forum is an appropriate forum.  
This nuanced distinction had been picked up by the Singapore High Court in OCBC Capital 
Investment Asia Ltd v Wong Hua Choon.12 The learned Andrew Ang J held that where 
parties have agreed to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of a particular forum they cannot argue 
that that forum in inappropriate. In that case, there was no dispute that the Malaysian courts 
would be appropriate, the issue was simply whether they would be clearly or distinctly more 
appropriate than the Singapore courts. Submitting to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Malaysian courts simply meant that they were an appropriate forum, but not the only one.13 
Similarly, this distinction had been foreshadowed by the English High Court in a 2005 
decision:14 
There can be no doubt that it is implicit in a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause that 
both parties accept when they agree to it that it will be appropriate for that court in 
the interests of justice, as distinct from obligatory to exercise jurisdiction over all 
disputes which may reasonably be envisaged as arising in relation to their agreement. 
That, however, does not go as far as saying that it is agreed that in all 
circumstances that may in future arise the designated court will 
necessarily be the court where the case may most suitably be tried for 
the interests of all parties and the ends of justice. If that were so, the effect of 
such a clause would be indistinguishable from that of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. 
The forum non conveniens test would be deployed not as a flexible comparative 
exercise but so as to impose an inflexible constraint analogous to that imposed by a 
contract. 
From a contractual perspective, the English tendency to deny a forum non conveniens 
challenge in the face of a non-exclusive forum jurisdiction agreement would be sound if, 
upon a proper construction of the agreement, it could be said (non-exhaustively) that:15 
(a)  the parties have expressly or impliedly agreed to waive jurisdictional 
objections; 
(b)  the parties have expressly or impliedly agreed that the chosen forum is the 
most appropriate forum; or 
(c)  the parties have expressly or implied agreed not to have the suit heard 
elsewhere (which effectively makes it an exclusive jurisdiction clause). 
Conclusion 
                                                          
12 [2010] SGHC 219, citing inter alia Bambang Sutrisno v. Bali International Finance Ltd [1999] 2 SLR(R) 632 
and PT Jaya Putra Kundur Indah v Guthrie Overseas Investments Pte Ltd [1996] SGHC 285. It is noted that the 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement in that case included an express agreement for one party to commence 
proceedings in any other jurisdiction other than the nominated court. 
13 It is noted that both Orchard Capital I Ltd v Ravindra Kumar Jhunjhunwala [2012] SGCA 16 and OCBC 
Capital Investment Asia Ltd v Wong Hua Choon [2010] SGHC 219 do not involve a non-exclusive choice of 
Singapore jurisdiction agreement, although that should not ipso facto affect the proper reasoning suggested here. 
14 BP Plc v AON Limited and anor [2005] EWHC 2554 (Comm) at para. 23 per Colman J. It was held that there 
was no breach involved in applying to serve out where there was a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement for 
Illinois, for there were at the date of the application no proceedings pending in the Illinois court; but that in all 
the circumstances it was not possible to show that England was clearly the more appropriate forum for the trial of 
the issues. Colman J did not explain with clarity why it would a breach of the non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement for a party to commence proceedings in England if the opposing party has already commenced 
proceedings in Illinois. 
15 See Yeo, at section VI. 
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In sum, this decision is a celebrated step towards a precise calibration of the parties’ 
contractual rights and obligations in the court’s overall assessment of where an international 
dispute ought to be adjudicated. The careful practitioner must no longer hold the 
assumption, based on mixed English case law or otherwise, that the presence of a non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreement would ipso facto create a strong prima facie case that the 
nominated court would be clearly or distinctly more appropriate than another forum. 
